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1 Introduction 
In Germany, organic farming is monitored by 20 approved private control bodies (CBs). Pooling data from five important German 
CBs, we complement earlier studies by Gambelli et al. (2014), Zorn et al. (2013) and Lippert et al. (2014). These studies have 
shown for single CBs in different European countries that non-compliance can partly be explained by farm characteristics. Here, 
we extend the analysis to the influence of CBs and national or regional competent authorities on control results. 
3 Method and data 
A latent, unobservable variable y* (e.g., the  expected net 
benefit of not complying with the organic standard) is 
considered to depend on some observed variables xi like 
farm size or control body (CB) (see first column of the Table): 
  
 y* = β0 + β1 x1 +… + βn xn + ε.  
  
The larger y*, the higher is the probability P(y = 1) of non-
compliance. The occurrence of a severe sanction issued by 
the CB is our proxy variable for y. Binary logit models are 
used to test the effects of xi on the probability P(y = 1):  
  
 
    . 
  
The data originates from five important German organic CBs 
that provided their complete 2009 and 2010 control data base 
on organic farms. The sample represents more than two-
thirds of the German organic farms. On average, a farm in 
the dataset is controlled 1.22 times a year. The mean control 
frequency however differs between the CBs in a range from 
1.14 up to 1.29. These differences could result from different 
control implementations but also from different risk 
classifications of the farmers by the CB. 
 
For a pooled dataset covering both years and for each year 
separately we estimate models, firstly, as unrestricted models 
with all potential explanatory variables and, secondly, as 
restricted models by stepwise excluding non-significant 
variables. 
 
Starting point of the analysis is a model based on farm 
characteristics only. This model then is extended by adding 
dummy variables for former sanctions, for the CB, and, for 
large federal states. Finally, models for combinations of these 
extensions are estimated. 
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Model type
Model specified
Observations
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC)
McFadden's R² (Pseudo-R²)
Agricultural area (ha) 0.001 *** 0.001 * 0.001 *** 0.001 * 0.001 ** 0.001 ***
Organic control experience (years) 0.003 -0.019 ** -0.019 **
Processor (yes=1) a -0.017 0.019
Contract processor (yes=1) -0.115 * -0.029 -0.112 * -0.127 * -0.091 *
Farm is controlled for private organic 
standards (yes=1)
0.495 *** 0.364 *** 0.503 *** 0.368 *** 0.526 *** 0.298 ***
Farm is controlled for international 
organic standards (yes=1)
0.449 * 0.543 * 0.448 * 0.536 * 0.428 * 0.378 *
Conversion area (yes=1) 0.337 *** 0.223 ** 0.330 *** 0.230 ** 0.328 *** 0.305 ***
Conventional area (yes=1) 0.328 *** 0.439 *** 0.323 *** 0.439 *** 0.263 *** 0.166 **
Cereals (yes=1) 0.004 0.102
Root crops (yes=1) 0.028 -0.036
Industrial crops (yes=1) -0.064 -0.021
Fresh vegetables (yes=1) 0.178 ** 0.167 * 0.187 ** 0.180 * 0.157 * 0.141 *
Fodder crop production (yes=1) 0.160 * 0.109 0.171 ** 0.161 * 0.178 ** 0.202 ***
Other arable crops (yes=1) 0.203 0.315
Permanent grassland (yes=1) -0.332 *** -0.407 ** -0.323 *** -0.403 ** -0.308 *** -0.289 **
Fruits and berries (yes=1) 0.218 * 0.107 0.222 * 0.226 * 0.224 *
Grapes (yes=1) -0.723 *** -0.751 ** -0.727 *** -0.744 ** -0.749 *** -0.541 **
Other permanent crops (yes=1) 0.327 *** 0.262 * 0.342 *** 0.280 * 0.309 *** 0.376 ***
Bovine animals (yes=1) 0.579 *** 0.519 *** 0.576 *** 0.500 *** 0.553 *** 0.607 ***
Pigs (yes=1) 0.241 *** 0.250 * 0.244 *** 0.261 ** 0.237 *** 0.248 ***
Sheep (yes=1) 0.062 0.024
Goats (yes=1) -0.073 0.051
Poultry (yes=1) 0.451 *** 0.393 *** 0.453 *** 0.400 *** 0.410 ** 0.404 **
Bees (yes=1) -0.160 -0.253
Dummy var. for the year 2010 (yes=1) 0.143 ** X 0.143 ** 0.142 ** 0.146 **
Mixed orchards (“Streuobst ”, yes=1) -0.290 *** -0.393 *** -0.285 *** -0.395 *** -0.186 ** -0.280 **
Dummy variable  for severe sanction in 
previous year (yes=1)
X 1.172 *** X 1.175 *** X X
Dummy variable for control body (CB) B X X X X -0.398 *** X
Dummy variable for CB C X X X X X 0.530 ***
Dummy v. for Baden-Württemberg (BW) X X X X -0.320 *** X
Dummy v. for Niedersachsen (NI) X X X X X 0.293 ***
Constant -3.546 *** -3.0652 *** -3.537 *** -3.0515 *** -3.401 *** -3.742 ***
29,157
Unrestricted models Restricted models
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29,157 13,821 29,157 13,821 29,157
0.060
-587.6 -327.4 -676.1 -418.3 -702.5 -757.2
0.061 0.081 0.061 0.080 0.064
4 Results and discussion 
Among the significant effects the sanction probability reduction due to contract processing and grape production and the 
increasing effect of an adherence to a stricter private standard are surprising; the positive effect of the agricultural area may be 
explained by higher farm complexity. The low Pseudo-R² values suggest to consider further variables that better represent 
farmers’ personal characteristics, all the more as we partly attribute the high relevance of former sanctions to such characteristics.  
 
As we tried to control for regionally different  natural conditions by including farm characteristics into our analysis, the significant 
federal state effects (see dummies BW and NI) and the CB effects hint at differences in the control implementation. Hence, our 
results support the need for a more harmonized implementation of organic control systems. 
  2 Hypotheses 
We assume that opportunistic farmers, making a decision on whether to comply with an organic standard or not, implicitly balance 
the expected net benefits B of non-compliance. B depends on (i) compliance costs, (ii) probabilities of detection and (iii) farmers’ 
future sanction related income losses in case of detected non-compliance. Factors (i) through (iii) are likely to be influenced by 
farm characteristics; factors (ii) and (iii) are also affected by the behaviour of the control body and the regional authority. 
 Table. Results of selected logit models explaining the occurrence of at 
 least one severe sanction. 
Own calculations based on CB data provided by Bundesanstalt für Landwirtschaft und Ernährung (2011). 
X – variable was not used. Variables with empty cells, were excluded from the restricted models. 
Significance levels: * < 0.1, ** < 0.01, *** < 0.001. 
